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Murdoch, Iris. The Sovereignty of Good. New York: Routledge, 2001, 
126 pp., $16.76 USD (pbk), ISBN 13: 979-0-415-25552-3 (pbk)
he Sovereignty of Good is a short volume (70 pages in its first, 
1970, edition) composed of three previously separately 
published essays on moral philosophy by the British 
philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch. One of its many 
appeals is that it is not like the typical (grey-soberly 
analytical) British philosophy text. This can be said not only 
regarding Murdoch's lively style of writing but also 
concerning the content of her ideas. Murdoch's book is a 
reaction against the predominant Anglo-Saxon moral 
philosophy of her time. Against the continuous efforts of the 
latter for making moral affairs either a non-sense or an 
emotional-subjective matter, Murdoch offers the peculiar 
Platonist approach of stating Good as the objective aim of the 
virtuous (unselfish and loving) person's attention. 
The first of the three essays, "The Idea of Perfection," offers a 
critical approach to several analytical philosophers such as G. 
E. Moore, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Ayer, Hare, and Stuart 
Hampshire and their —at the time— influential moral 
philosophy. The outcome of this analytical moral philosophy 
was its sharp division between fact and value, and the belief 
that while the former is the proper object of knowledge, the 
latter lack of any cognitive content — a picture of a world 
deprived of intrinsic value, a cold neutral realm of pure facts. 
The moral agent in such a world is the "free" (abstract, 
unconditioned, autonomous) will, a will of choosing. It is 
highly significant, as Murdoch suggests, that this picture of 
the world and the moral subject is also typical of the most 
famous continental philosophy at the time, existentialism. 
Murdoch situates her self in the crossroads of these quite the 
opposite trends in contemporary philosophy and shows that 
they share more than it could appear at first glance. 
Against this "Kantian" (liberal) picture of human moral 
agency, Murdoch rightfully argues that we perform moral 
actions, not because an empty unconditioned will, but 
because we see the objective moral value in the world, i.e., 
values that do not depend on our will, nor are the outcome of 
our choosing. Those, she believes, are objective features that 
we must learn to spot in the object by attending to it without 
the distorting clouds of our selfish nature. To illustrate this, 
she uses her most famous example of "M" and "D," a 
hypothetical "ordinary and everyday" situation of moral 
evaluation from a woman (M) towards her daughter-in-law 
(D). (It is curious that here Murdoch retains the pedantic 
analytical style of using symbols for no reason at all in her 
intent to argue against this very tradition, perhaps in an 
attempt to not appear as a complete outsider). Our evaluation 
of an object is true when we see it how it is through just, 
loving and unselfish attention toward it. A since there is no 
general formula for each moral situation, we should develop 
a sensibility to feel "magnetic pull" of the perfectness of things 
in order to see them as they are. Thus, love is knowledge of 
the individual object in its perfection. This is a move directed 
against the dominant moral philosophy of her time, not only 
for its cognitive approach to morality but also for rescuing 
the commonly neglected concept of love. 
In the second essay, "On 'God' and 'Good,'" Murdoch 
struggles between two one-sided opposite trends in 
contemporary philosophy: the "romantic" humanism 
(existentialism) that proclaims that we are free, and the 
"scientific" (reductionist) empiricism that makes of man just 
another object of nature captive in its iron cause-effect chain. 
She is not satisfied with either of these views, although she 
makes a significant concession to the latter when she accepts 
a "realistic" picture of human nature following the "quasi-
mechanical" Freudian description of our psyche. The 
Hobbesian notion of homo homini lupus seems to dominate 
her view on this. Murdoch openly declares that, for her, 
human beings are naturally selfish. She does not take this 
assumption to its final implications, but it follows from this 
that all her positive views on how we should be, stand against 
our supposed nature as human beings. So, why we should 
fight our nature, why selfishness —our true nature— should 
not be admitted as goodness? Murdoch does not address this 
contradiction nor put in question the Freudian picture of the 
self either. She naively identifies a socio-historical 
conditioned mode of behavior with an abstract (shared by all 
separate individuals) human nature. 
 Here Murdoch seems to be dealing with "the death of the 
subject," i.e., the shipwreck of the idea of subjectivity as self-
determinate consciousness and a spontaneous will. On the 
other hand, Murdoch explicitly deals with the "death of God," 
i.e., the disappearance of any transcendental telos for giving 
sense to our lives. How to be morally good in a life without 
God? This theme was also artistically developed in some of 
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her novels, such as The Time of the Angels. Murdoch faces 
what J.P. Sartre called "starting point of existentialism" in his 
famous short paper Existentialism is a Humanism, but she 
gives an entirely different solution to the problem. Although 
Murdoch seems to be entirely in agreement with this divine 
death, she is interested in the structure of an activity directed 
toward God as a transcendental object, prayer. For this 
activity resembles the precious process of redirecting our 
loving attention toward a non-egocentric object. The Good, 
supreme aim of the virtuous person’s attention, should be 
similar to God in this sense; that is, in the sense of an object 
that we could only see if we lose ourselves in it if we "expel" 
our ego —that "fat relentless" enemy of morality, as Murdoch 
calls it— from our view. 
It is not hard to find this "expelling" procedure that Murdoch 
is proposing as a problematic, if not self-contradictory, and 
impossible aspiration. Here I am emptying my self to "see" 
the other as he is, but if the other wants to do the same, we 
will end up in the pointless relation of two empty mirrors 
facing each other to reflect nothing. More importantly, this 
moral philosophy seems to lead us to a sort of "humble" 
(miserable and poor) existence: the less you are, the better 
you are. One could sense an inclination of the author to take 
an idealized image of the "simple people" as the closest to 
goodness.  
This romantic view is even more palpable in the third and last 
chapter, "The sovereignty of good over other concepts," 
where Murdoch again makes the "selfish" human nature in a 
Godless world her starting point. This is perhaps the most 
positive of the three essays, for it is filled with her views on 
how we could move from this selfish natural starting point 
toward virtue and goodness. Putting in practice her believe in 
that metaphors have cognitive potential; she mobilizes Plato's 
allegories of the cave and the sun as heuristic devices for 
developing her views. Murdoch sees the transcendental 
nature of goodness in the compulsory but yet never quite 
reachable aim to "pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and 
join the world as it really is." Loving the truth is then the same 
as loving goodness. The object of true love must always be 
under the light of the Platonic sun. This kind of vision is 
supposed to be the key for virtuous behavior, as Murdoch 
embraces the belief that correct vision occasions right 
conduct. 
Ultimately, the prescription of The Sovereignty of Good is to 
urge us into humility. For Murdoch, as it can be easily 
deduced from her arguments, this is the closest, the more 
similar virtue to goodness. Is humility the virtue which 
provides us with true vision. "The humble man, because he 
sees himself as nothing, can see other things as they are," she 
says. Even Sartre would be astonished by the sweet innocence 
of this exhortation, especially when Murdoch repeatedly 
accuses him of being too romantic or unrealistic. What she 
does not provide to any extent is an explanation of why being 
humble is so hard. Here she has nothing else to say except to 
appeal to a presumed human (selfish) nature as the enemy of 
morality. The naivety of her romanticism consists of its 
inability to take into account the socio-historical reasons 
than make us selfish. In a world in which being selfish is the 
only way to survive, the humble shall indeed "accept the 
death," but not in the sophisticated metaphoric sense used by 
Murdoch at the end of her book, but sadly in a literal sense. 
Therefore, the path to goodness does not consist of a personal 
quest of "unselfing" but a historical act of transformation of 
the social structure; it is a collective struggle for the objective 
(social) conditions to enable us to become multifaceted and 
complete selves, not a personal exercise of illumination by 
becoming nothing, by negating ourselves. 
Murdoch's book is valuable not because of its uncertain and 
romantic answers but because it draws our attention toward 
essential and yet for a long-time neglected questions in 
philosophy. It is a warm exotic island within the cold sea of 
British XX century philosophy, and the best of its merits 
resides in its daring spirit. Its challenging claim is against the 
famous last sentence of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Moral 
concerns are issues that we cannot afford to "pass over in 
silence." If our language turns out to be unable to address 
them within our philosophy, that only means that we have a 
terrible philosophy of language. 
